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The simplest way to show this is just to compare the results from the districts drawn in 2011 with those used from 2002-2010. In 2012, Obama won 53% of the statewide vote. He won more votes than Romney in 55 of the Assembly districts used in the previous decade, but he only beat Romney in 43 of the newly drawn Assembly districts.

A hiker named Thomas Nelson was walking in the woods off the Ice Age National Scenic Trail in Ringle when he came across a shelter dug into the side of an embankment, according to a Marathon County Sheriff's Office incident report. Nelson opened the log-paneled door a crack, peeked in and saw a man sleeping on a cot surrounded by tools and canned food.

According to a criminal complaint, a girl told police that Button touched her inappropriately, had intercourse with her and forced her to perform oral sex on him several times between 2010 and early 2014. She also told officers that Button took pictures of her and him without their clothes on and made her wear special clothes for him.

The hate crime legislation enacted in 2009 directed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to submit a second report on federal mandatory minimums.28 The commission presented its second report in October 2011.29 A number of things had changed between the first and second Commission reports. Sentencing under the Guidelines had been in place for only a relatively short period of time when the first report was written. By the time of the second report, the number of defendants sentenced by federal courts had grown to almost three times the number sentenced under the Guidelines when the commission wrote its first report.30 The judicial landscape has changed as well. When the commission issued its first report, the Guidelines were considered binding upon sentencing judges.31 After the Supreme Court's Booker decision and its progeny, the Guidelines became but the first step in the sentencing process.32 In addition, the Fair Sentencing Act, passed in 2010, reduced the powder cocaine-crack cocaine ratio from 100 to 10 to roughly 18 to 1.33

3. Offenses carrying a drug mandatory minimum penalty were used less often, as the number and percentages of offenders convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty has decreased since fiscal year 2010.

The eight substances are heroin, powder cocaine, cocaine base (crack), PCP, LSD, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Criminal penalties related to each substance provide one set of mandatory minimums for trafficking in a very substantial amount listed in Section 841(b)(1)(A), and a second, lower set of mandatory minimums for trafficking in a lower but still substantial amount listed in Section 841(a)(1)(B). The first set (841(b)(1)(A) level) features the following thresholds:

At one time, possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine (cocaine base) was punished 100 times more severely than possession with intent to distribute cocaine in powdered form.294 Defendants claimed the distinction had a racially disparate impact. The claim was almost universally rejected.295

Id. at 66 ("The total number of federal cases has almost tripled from 29,011 in fiscal year 1990 to 83,947 in fiscal year 2010"); see also Commission Report I, supra note 20 at 51 (noting that 29,011 defendants were sentenced under the Guidelines in fiscal year 1990). Moreover, although the second report noted that many of the mandatory minimum offenses were rarely prosecuted, it identified 195 mandatory minimum statutes. Commission Report II, supra note 26 at 348. The first report had identified 60. Commission Report I, supra note 20 at 11.

P.L. 111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). Prior to enactment, 5000 grams of powder cocaine or 50 grams of crack cocaine triggered the Controlled Substances Act's 10-year mandatory minimum, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii) (2006 ed.), and 500 grams of powder or 5 grams of crack triggered its 5-year mandatory minimum. Id. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii) (2006 ed.). The FSA established a 5000 grams to 280 gram ratio for the 10-year mandatory minimum, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii), and a 500 grams to 28 gram ratio for the 5-year mandatory minimum. Id. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii).

Id. § 924(c). Section 924(c) has been the subject of repeated Supreme Court litigation and regular congressional amendment since its inception in 1968. However, the crime of violence prong of the section, rather than the drug trafficking prong, has been the scene of most of the activity. See United States v. O'Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 221 (2010) ("The Court must interpret, once again, §924(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code"); Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017); Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014); Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); United States v. Abbott, 562 U.S.18 (2010); Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568 (2009); Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002); Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000); Mascarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1 (1997); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993); P.L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1223 (1968), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1970 ed.); P.L. 91-644, §13, 84 Stat. 1889 (1971), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976 ed.); P.L. §1005, 98 Stat. 2138 (1984), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1982 ed.) (Supp. II); P.L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 457 (1986), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1982 ed.) (Supp. IV); P.L. 100-690, §6460, 102 Stat. 4373 (1988), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988 ed.); P.L. 101-647, §1101,104 Stat. 4829 (1990), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1988 ed.) (Supp. II); P.L. 105-386, §1, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000 ed.); P.L. 109-92, §6(b), 119 Stat. 2102 (2005), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2000 ed.) (Supp. V).

Id. § 921(a)(3), (4) ("(3) The term 'firearm' means (A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; ... (C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (D) any destructive device.... (4) The term 'destructive device' means - (A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas - (i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, (v) mine, or (vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses ..."). E.g., United States v. York, 600 F.3d 347, 354 (5th Cir. 2010) (Molotov cocktail constitutes a firearm for purposes of § 924(c)); United States v. Tomkins, 782 F.3d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 2015) (pipe bombs constitute firearms for purposes of § 924(c)).

United States v. Garrido, 596 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Possession of a toy or replica gun cannot sustain a conviction under § 924(c)"); see also United States v. Martinez-Armestica, 846 F.3d 436, 440 (1st Cir. 2017); United States v. Lawson, 810 F.3d 1032, 1039 (7th Cir. 2016).

United States v. Gurka, 605 F.3d 40, 44 (1st Cir. 2010) ("We join the ... circuits holding that Watson does not affect the prong of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) concerned with 'possession in furtherance.'") (citing United States v. Gardner, 602 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2010) and United States v. Mahan, 586 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009)); see also United States v. Miranda, 666 F.3d 1280, 1282-284 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Dickerson, 705 F.3d 683, 688-90 (7th Cir. 2013).

United States v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Mashek, 606 F.3d 922, 930 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 238 (1993)); United States v. Roberson, 459 F.3d 39, 48 (1st Cir. 2006); Williams, 344 F.3d at 371.

United States v. Sandstrom, 594 F.3d 634, 658 (8th Cir. 2010) ("... [M]ultiple underlying offenses support multiple §924(c) convictions"); United States v. Catalan-Roman, 585 F.3d 453, 472 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Penny, 576 F.3d 297, 316 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[W]hen two separate predicate offenses for triggering §924(c)(1) are charged and proved, a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for two separate crimes, even if both offenses were committed in the course of the same event"); United States v. Looney, 532 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2008).

The vast majority of the Supreme Court's Section 924(e) cases involved at last one prior state conviction, see, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016); Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013); Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011), overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); McNeill v. United States v. 563 U.S. 816 (2011); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 (2008); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23 (2007); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005); Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994); Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).

18 U.S.C. § 921(20) ("The term 'crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year' does not include- (A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices, or (B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less. What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms."). See United States v. Sellers, 784 F.3d 876, 881-87 (2d Cir. 2015) (A New York youthful offender conviction set aside as a matter of New York law does not qualify as a predicate offense) (citing United States v. Collins, 61 F.3d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Clark, 993 F.2d 402, 403 (4th Cir. 1993); and distinguishing, United States v. Ellis, 619 F.3d 72,75 (1st Cir. 2010) ("'It was not blatant error for the sentencing court to take [a defendant's] juvenile adjudication into consideration for the purpose of applying the ACCA' because 'juvenile adjudications [under Massachusetts law] are not "set aside" for the purpose of imposing sentence in later criminal proceedings.'")). 2b1af7f3a8